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DOES THE CHARTER FOLLOW THE FLAG?
REVISITING CONSTITUTIONAL EXTRATERRITORIALITY AFTER R v HAPE
Chanakya Sethi*

INTRODUCTION
Jacques Maritain, the noted philosopher and political thinker and a principal drafter of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, once contended that “political philosophy
must get rid of the word, as well as the concept, of Sovereignty.”1 He reasoned as much
“not because [sovereignty] is an antiquated concept,” or “because the concept of
Sovereignty creates insuperable difficulties and theoretical entanglements in the field of
international law,” but because “this concept is intrinsically wrong and bound to mislead
us if we keep on using it.”2 Maritain’s proposal may have been exceedingly bold and his
criticisms perhaps too harsh, but they nonetheless resonate over half a century later in
light of the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent decision in R v Hape.3
The judgment in Hape, where the Court concluded on the basis of international law,
including principles of sovereign equality and comity, that the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms4 cannot apply extraterritorially, has been described as “deeply
problematic on many levels.”5 Criticisms from scholars of both constitutional law6 and
international law7 have been far from reserved. John Currie, for example, has assailed
the Court for giving Canadian government officials “a blank cheque … to violate the
Charter with impunity as long as they do so abroad.”8 Given Hape’s purported
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Jacques Maritain, Man and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951) at 29.
Ibid.
3
2007 SCC 26, [2007] 2 SCR 292 [Hape].
4
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11
[Charter].
5
John Currie, “Khadr’s Twist on Hape: Tortured Determinations of the Extraterritorial Reach of
the Canadian Charter” (2008) 46 Can YB Int’l Law 307 at 316 [Currie, “Tortured
Determinations”].
6
See e.g., Kent Roach, “R. v. Hape Creates Charter-Free Zones for Canadian Officials Abroad”
(2007) 53 Crim LQ 1.
7
See e.g., Amir Attaran, “Have Charter, Will Travel? Extraterritoriality in Constitutional Law and
Canadian Exceptionalism” (2008) 87 Can Bar Rev 515; Currie, “Tortured Determinations,” supra
note 5.
8
Currie, ibid.
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grounding in principles of international law, it is not without some irony that the
decision has been criticized for its reliance on an “incomplete—frankly, incorrect—view
of international law,”9 the result of which is that the Court has “sacrifice[d] a basic
aspect of Canadian sovereignty itself: namely expectations that Canadian officials
respect Charter values when they act in their official capacity at home or abroad.”10
Equally troubling as the substantive outcome of Hape, however, is the criticism of the
approach adopted by the Court in articulating its reasoning. The majority opinion has
been faulted for its largely technical analysis of international law without any
meaningful discussion of “the basic values and aspirations of the Charter or what the
Charter means to Canada’s image of itself, especially when it presents itself to the
world.”11 Moreover, the Court is criticized for its “radical” approach to reconciling its
own precedents, forsaking a scalpel in favour of a sledgehammer. The decision in Hape
“does not build on or attempt to distinguish prior precedents in this area but rather rejects
them, as a critic working outside of the system might do,” Kent Roach has argued,
concluding that “[t]his is not the way that judges should develop the law.”12
The purpose of this essay is to accept the invitation implicit in these criticisms by
revisiting Hape and asking anew: Does the Charter follow the flag?13 The importance of
this question is self-evident. The Charter is a cherished part of Canada’s Constitution;
the two decades of jurisprudence that have sought to shape and give life to its amorphous
protections mark the signal achievement of the Supreme Court of Canada in its modern
era. More pragmatically though, as Amir Attaran has suggested, “Hape is an imperfect
judgment that cannot last.”14 If that is indeed the case, as the Court’s more recent
jurisprudence strongly suggests it is, then an analysis of potential alternatives serves to
advance discussion of this important question.
In this paper, I conclude that the Court’s reasoning in Hape rests on a flawed
understanding of international law. Indeed, a more searching analysis reveals that there
is ample basis to conclude that extraterritorial application of the Charter—far from being
anathema to international law—is in harmony with emerging principles of state
responsibility. An analysis of foreign jurisprudence provides added support for this
conclusion. The question of international law aside, however, fidelity to the principles
underlying the Charter necessitates an interpretation that contemplates extraterritorial
application.
This paper is divided into three parts. In Part I, I review the decision in Hape on its own
terms, limiting my discussion to those aspects of international law discussed by the
Court itself. I attempt to show that the Court’s conclusions on Canada’s extraterritorial
9

Attaran, supra note 7 at 523.
Roach, supra note 6 at 1.
11
Ibid at 4.
12
Ibid at 3.
13
The diction of this question, and the title for this paper, were inspired by the title of an excellent
book on the same topic in the American context: See Kal Raustiala, Does the Constitution Follow
the Flag? The Evolution of Territoriality in American Law (New York: Oxford University Press,
2009).
14
Attaran, supra note 7 at 1.
10
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jurisdiction and the authority of Parliament are based on a flawed assessment of
international law. I also argue that the Court’s subsequent decision to recognize an
exception to those conclusions exposes fatal contradictions within the Hape doctrine. In
Part II, I propose a different way to look at the question of the Charter’s extraterritorial
application through the lens of sovereign responsibility. I review several judgements of
foreign high courts that show why this alternative approach is more consonant with
emerging principles of international law. Finally, in Part III, I endeavour to demonstrate
how the approach offered in Part II can be reconciled with the Charter and Hape,
offering my view of how the Court might proceed in the future by building on the
principal minority opinion in Hape itself.

I.

THE DECISION

The judgement in Hape was at once unified and fractured. The case concerned the
question of whether the Charter applied to searches of the accused’s office premises in
the Turks and Caicos conducted jointly by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and local
police.15 The accused brought an application in an Ontario court to exclude evidence
collected from the searches on the basis that the searches, allegedly conducted without
local warrants, infringed his section 8 rights against unreasonable search and seizure.16
On final appeal, the nine justices of the Court were unanimous in judgement—there had
been no violation of Charter rights in this case—but three separate opinions offered
three separate sets of reasons as to why. The crux of the debate focussed on the meaning
of section 32(1) of the Charter, which governs its application:
32. (1) This Charter applies
(a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters
within the authority of Parliament including all matters relating to the
Yukon Territory and Northwest Territories; and
(b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all
matters within the authority of the legislature of each province.17
Justice LeBel, writing for the five-justice majority,18 articulated an entirely new
approach to constitutional extraterritoriality based largely on conclusions as to

15

Hape, supra note 3 at paras 3-6.
Ibid at paras 11-14; Charter, supra note 4, s 8 (“Everyone has the right to be secure against
unreasonable search or seizure”). See also R v Hape, 2002 CanLII 4900 (Sup Ct), aff’d 201 OAC
126 (available on CanLii) (CA).
17
Charter, ibid, s 32(1).
18
Hape, supra note 3 at paras 1-122.
16
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international law and in doing so rejected several of the Court’s key precedents.19 Justice
Bastarache, writing for himself and two other justices,20 declined to follow Justice LeBel
in his emphasis on international law and instead articulated a new approach that, though
grounded in the Court’s prior precedents, also sought to reform them. Finally, Justice
Binnie, writing for himself,21 concluded that Hape was a straightforward case that could
fit within the Court’s earlier precedents and declined to use the occasion to engage in
wholesale reform of the Court’s doctrine.

A. CONCLUSIONS BASED ON JURISDICTION
The majority opinion in Hape presents two concepts in international law—one a binding
principle, the other non-binding—and suggests that both are instrumental to a proper
interpretation of section 32(1). The first concept is sovereign equality, which is described
as a “cornerstone of the international legal system.”22 According to Justice LeBel, the
concept’s “foundational principles—including non-intervention and respect for the
territorial sovereignty of foreign states—cannot be regarded as anything less than firmly
established rules of customary international law.”23 In other words, a violation of the
principle of sovereign equality is a violation of international law.24 The second concept
is comity, which includes the “rules observed by states in their mutual relations out of
politeness, convenience and goodwill, rather than strict legal obligation.”25 In contrast to
sovereign equality, “comity is more a principle of interpretation than a rule of law,
because it does not arise from formal obligations.”26 Comity, in other words, is nonbinding.
The distinction between the binding nature of the principle of sovereign equality and the
non-binding principle of comity is of much importance to the judgement in Hape. As a
result of its non-binding nature, the notion of comity “does not offer a rationale for
condoning another state’s breach of international law” because, as the majority

19

There is some debate as to whether crucial precedents—including most significantly R v Cook,
which was previously the leading case on application of the Charter extraterritorially—were in
fact overruled or not. The official case report suggests Cook was “distinguished,” but several
observers, including Binnie J in his opinion in Hape, have concluded that Cook was overturned
sub silento. See ibid at para 182 (Binnie J, concurring); Currie, “Tortured Determinations,” supra
note 5 at 313; Roach, supra note 6 at 1; H. Scott Fairley, “International Law Comes of Age: Hape
v. The Queen” (2008) 87 Can Bar Rev 229 at 230, 238.
At least one scholar, however, has noted that the fact that Cook was not overruled
explicitly is significant, especially to those who would like to abandon Hape and return to the core
of the doctrine Cook espoused. See Attaran, supra note 7 at 547. See also R v Cook, [1998] 2 SCR
597, 164 DLR (4th) 1 [Cook].
20
Hape, ibid at paras 123-80.
21
Ibid at paras 181-92.
22
Ibid at para 46.
23
Ibid [emphasis added].
24
Ibid at para 40ff.
25
Ibid at para 47 [emphasis added].
26
Ibid.
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concludes, “the need to uphold international law may trump the principle of comity.”27 It
is worth pausing here to observe a few points which will have special relevance later in
this paper. First, note the tentative nature of this conclusion: comity “may” be trumped;
crucially, it is not always trumped in the face of an international law violation. Second,
the question of whether a given state is exempted from adhering to principles of comity
toward another state depends on that second state’s adherence to international law. And
third, a hierarchy of norms is apparent: In sharp contrast to comity, sovereignty equality,
as the “the linchpin of the whole body of international legal standards,” is a principle that
is generally inviolable.28
Having laid down these foundational principles, the majority in Hape then discusses the
concept of jurisdiction. Drawing on well-known treatises, the Court observes that there
are three distinct forms. The first, prescriptive jurisdiction, concerns “the power to make
rules, issue commands or grant authorizations that are binding upon persons and
entities.”29 The second, enforcement jurisdiction, is “the power to use coercive means to
ensure that rules are followed, commands are executed or entitlements are upheld.”30
The third and final form, adjudicative jurisdiction, relates to “the power of a state’s
courts to resolve disputes or interpret the law through decisions that carry binding
force.”31
To illustrate the application of the above forms of jurisdiction, the majority places much
reliance on—but misinterprets a key aspect of—the seminal case of the SS Lotus.32 Some
background may be helpful: The case involved a collision between French and Turkish
steamers on the high seas. The Turkish vessel was very heavily damaged and thus sank,
killing eight. The French steamer, though badly damaged, managed to sail to the nearby
Turkish port city of Constantinople. Soon after its arrival, however, the ship’s captain
was arrested on charges of involuntary manslaughter. He was ultimately tried and
convicted of various offenses under Turkish law by a Turkish court in Turkey. These
facts afforded the Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”) an opportunity to
offer its understanding of extraterritorial jurisdiction in its prescriptive, enforcement and
adjudicative forms.
The PCIJ adopted a narrow view of enforcement jurisdiction, which was cited by the
Court in Hape:
Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a
State is that—failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary—it
may not exercise its power [i.e., enforcement jurisdiction] in any form in

27

Ibid at para 51.
Ibid at para 40. Of course, this assertion is limited to the context of the extraterritorial
application of a given state’s laws in another state. The UN Security Council, under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter, is capable of authorizing military action that would obviously violate the target
state’s sovereignty. The UN-backed military action in Libya in early 2011, for example, was
conducted under such authority. See UNSC, 2011, 6498th Mtg, UN Doc S/Res/1973 (2011).
29
Hape, supra note 3 at para 58.
30
Ibid.
31
Ibid.
32
The Case of the SS “Lotus” (France v Turkey) (1927), PCIJ (Ser A), No 10 [Lotus].
28
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the territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly
territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory except by
virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom or from a
convention.33
The crucial point here is that the default position as it relates to enforcement jurisdiction
is that a state may not exercise such jurisdiction outside its own territory. An
exception—a “permissive rule”—would be consent of the state whose territory the other
state sought to act.34 The crux of Lotus, however, was not enforcement jurisdiction, as
recall that the French ship voluntarily entered Turkish territory by docking in
Constantinople; Turkey was not seeking to enforce any of its laws on French territory.35
The real issue in Lotus thus was whether “Turkey was able to extend the reach of its
penal laws, that is, its prescriptive jurisdiction, to events occurring outside Turkish
territory, on the high seas.”36 Here, the PCIJ adopted a “quite liberal”37 approach. In the
very next paragraph after the one quoted above—but one curiously passed over by the
Hape majority—the PCIJ concluded:
It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a State from
exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any case which
relates to acts which have taken place abroad, and in which it cannot rely
on some permissive rule of international law. Such a view would only be
tenable if international law contained a general prohibition to States to
extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to
persons, property and acts outside their territory, and if, as an exception to
this general prohibition, it allowed States to do so in certain specific cases.
But this is certainly not the case under international law as it stands at
present. Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that
States may not extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of
their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory, it leaves
them in this respect a wide measure of discretion, which is only limited in
certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State
remains free to adopt the principles which it regards as best and most
suitable.38
Put simply, a state must rely on a permissive rule to assert enforcement jurisdiction. In
sharp contrast, however, a state need only ensure there is no prohibitive rule when it
seeks to assert prescriptive or adjudicative jurisdiction. In other words, the “starting

33

Ibid at 18 [emphasis added].
Attaran, supra note 7 at 524.
35
John H Currie, Public International Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008) at 339-40 [Currie, Public
International Law].
36
Ibid at 340.
37
Ibid at 339.
38
Lotus, supra note 32 at 18-19 [emphasis added].
34
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premise, when it comes to the extent of the states’ prescriptive and adjudicative
jurisdiction, is essentially permissive.”39
The majority in Hape actually shows some appreciation for the territorial nexus
distinction between prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction on the one hand, and
enforcement jurisdiction on the other, though it does so with less sweep. In the
majority’s view, prescriptive jurisdiction is “primarily territorial,” but there are
“exceptions.”40 Nationality jurisdiction, for example, allows a state to “regulate [i.e.,
prescribe, in the language of Lotus] and adjudicate regarding actions committed by its
nationals in other countries, provided enforcement of the rules takes place when those
nationals are within the state’s own borders.”41 Crucially, the Court recognizes that such
extraterritorial prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction, without any extraterritorial
enforcement jurisdiction, does not offend either the principle of sovereign equality or
comity.42 Indeed, the majority cited several crimes in Canada that reflect extraterritorial
prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction.43
Though one can quibble with the majority’s selective adherence to the principles
enunciated in Lotus,44 the real problem in Hape comes with the Court’s conclusion that
“applying the Charter to activities that take place abroad implicates the extraterritorial

39

Currie, Public International Law, supra note 35 at 340.
It is worth noting, however, that some states, acting through domestic courts, have
voluntarily narrowed the scope of their extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction. For example,
European governments have in the past have protested American attempts to extend the
applicability of the Sherman Antitrust Act to cover all anticompetitive agreements made on
European soil. See 15 USC § 1 (2006). This has led the US Supreme Court to adopt a “rule of
reason” and an “effects doctrine” whereby it will query whether there is a reasonable basis for the
US government to exercise its extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction even if such jurisdiction is
enforced only domestically. See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2008) at 309.
As Brownlie has noted, however, the European protests are somewhat ironic given that
European laws often mirror American ones in their extraterritorial prescriptive reach. The UK, for
example, recently adopted its own equivalent of the American Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
criminalizing domestically the bribing of foreign officials on foreign soil. Notably, the UK law
goes much further than its US counterpart and has been described as “the FCPA on steroids.”
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 USC §§ 78dd-1ff (2006); Bribery Act 2010 (UK), 2010 c 23, s
6; and Dionne Seacrey, “UK Law on Bribes Has Firms in a Sweat” The Wall Street Journal (28
December 2010), online: The Wall Street Journal
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704118504576034080908533622.html>.
All the protests aside, international law is clear that such extraterritorial prescriptive
jurisdiction is legal. See generally, Brownlie at 300-8, Currie, Public International Law at 339-54,
Malcolm N Shaw, International Law, 6th ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) at
649-651.
40
Hape, supra note 3 at para 60.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid at para 64.
43
E.g., hijackings of Canadian aircraft while abroad, war crimes and other crimes against
humanity. Ibid at para 66, citing R v Terry, [1996] 2 SCR 207 at para 15, 135 DLR (4th) 214
[Terry].
44
See note 40, above.
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enforcement of Canadian law.”45 The majority’s conclusion that extraterritorial
application of the Charter necessitates, or at least results in, impermissible
extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction is flummoxing.46 Professor Currie, for example,
has argued that the Court has “fatally confused” the concepts of prescriptive and
adjudicative jurisdiction, on the one hand, with enforcement jurisdiction:47 The key
paragraph on this point from the Court’s judgement should be read in full:
The powers of prescription and enforcement are both necessary to
application of the Charter. The Charter is prescriptive in that it sets out
what the state and its agents may and may not do in exercising the state's
powers. Prescription is not in issue in the case at bar, but even so, the
Charter cannot be applied if compliance with its legal requirements cannot
be enforced. Enforcement of compliance with the Charter means that
when state agents act, they must do so in accordance with the requirements
of the Charter so as to give effect to Canadian law as it applies to the
exercise of the state power at issue. However, as has already been
discussed, Canadian law cannot be enforced in another state’s territory
without that state's consent. Since extraterritorial enforcement is not
possible, and enforcement is necessary for the Charter to apply,
extraterritorial application of the Charter is impossible.48
As Currie has observed, such reasoning makes an unfounded logical leap between the
premise that Canada has no enforcement jurisdiction over a given matter and the
conclusion that the matter itself therefore falls outside Canada’s prescription jurisdiction.
If this is true, the result entails “collapsing the distinction between prescriptive and
enforcement jurisdiction entirely.”49
The majority’s reasoning seems to presuppose that the Charter enforcement in cases
where a potential rights infringement occurs abroad requires extraterritorial enforcement.
But this view is demonstrably false based on the Court’s own jurisprudence. Less than
eight months after its decision in Hape, a unanimous Court in Canada (Justice) v Khadr
concluded that the Government of Canada’s extraterritorial actions had breached a
Canadian citizen’s Charter rights and thus crafted a remedy that it was able to enforce

45

Hape, supra note 3 at para 33.
See e.g., Attaran, supra note 7 at 524-29; Currie, “Tortured Determinations,” supra note 5 at 31;
James Stribopoulos, “The Charter’s Unstated Territorial Limits: R. v. Hape” TheCourt.ca (8 June
2007), online: TheCourt.ca <http://www.thecourt.ca/2007/06/08/the-charters-unstated-territoriallimits-r-v-hape/>.
Curiously, even a commentator who is generally supportive of the Court’s jurisprudence
in this area has been unable to explain its focus on enforcement jurisdiction. See Jane M Arbour,
“Canada v. Khadr: Reflections on the Use of International Law in the Repatriation Litigation”
(2010) 51 SCLR (2d) 275 at 277.
47
Currie, “Tortured Determinations,” ibid at 317.
48
Hape, supra note 3 at para 85.
49
Currie, “Tortured Determinations,” supra note 5 at 318, n 61.
46
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intraterritorially.50 There was no discussion in Khadr of an inability to enforce the
judgement extraterritorially, nor was there any need for such a discussion. Quite simply,
there is no exercise of enforcement jurisdiction when a Canadian court applies the
Charter, in a Canadian court proceeding, to the extraterritorial actions of Canadian
officials: “[A] court sitting only in Canada (and thus exercising enforcement jurisdiction
only in Canada) and applying a Canadian rule of law to events occurring abroad is
defining the prescriptive reach of that rule, not enforcing it abroad.”51 Examples of what
actually constitutes extraterritorial enforcement confirm this view: Arresting or detaining
persons in a foreign jurisdiction, serving a summons, mounting a police investigation,
and ordering the production of document—absent the consent of the local sovereign—
would all constitute exercises of enforcement jurisdiction.52 But a Charter remedy, as the
decision in Khadr clearly illustrates, involves no such impermissible act.
Given the majority opinion’s extensive analysis of the difference between prescriptive
and adjudicative jurisdiction on the one hand, and enforcement jurisdiction on the other,
it is difficult to comprehend how the Court reached the conclusion that an exercise of
any legitimate extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction was per se impermissible
extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction. One possible explanation may be an unspoken
fear that a Canadian court’s domestic enforcement of a Charter remedy concerning
extraterritorial acts after the fact would likely lead in the future to a kind of indirect
extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction before the fact when the Canadian government
alters its behaviour.53 For example, the judgement in Khadr will likely influence the
Canadian government’s behaviour abroad in similar situations in the future, which could
perhaps be construed as a kind of indirect extraterritorial enforcement by Canadian
courts. By this reasoning, one might surmise that the Court was wary of the possibility
that requiring Canadian officials to act in conformance with the Charter while abroad
would potentially lead to Canadian demands of local governments to run their affairs in a
particular way, thus running afoul of the principles of sovereign equality and comity.
Setting aside for a moment whether Canada is actually in a position to dictate to any
government how it should run its affairs, I can find no basis in international law to
support a conclusion that domestic enforcement of an extraterritorial act subject to
prescriptive jurisdiction can indirectly lead to impermissible extraterritorial enforcement.
More importantly, however, the Court offers no principle or precedent that would
support such a conclusion.
The minority in Hape recognizes that the issue of extraterritorial enforcement
jurisdiction does not actually arise. Justice Bastarache notes that the government has a

50

Canada (Justice) v Khadr, 2008 SCC 28 at para 31, [2008] 2 SCR 125 [Khadr]. The same
conclusion was reached as recently as last year in Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr, 2010 SCC 3,
[2010] 1 SCR 44 [Khadr II].
51
Currie, “Tortured Determinations,” supra note 5 at 317 [emphasis in original].
52
Brownlie, supra note 39 at 309.
53
The majority could be understood as making this point in Hape when it said, in passing, that:
“Here, to apply the Charter to the investigation in Turks and Caicos would of necessity compel
compliance by the foreign authorities, thus impinging on their sovereign authority.” For the
reasons discussed above, however, such a concern is without merit. Supra note 3 at para 29
[emphasis added].
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choice when faced with Charter requirements: It can choose not to act abroad at all or it
can negotiate with the local government for Charter-compliant standards of conduct
(say, insisting that an accused be afforded an attorney). The former option, as the Hape
majority ostensibly fails to appreciate, relies on the consent of the host nation and thus
offends neither sovereign equality nor comity. As the minority opinion concludes: “By
putting the onus squarely on Canadian authorities to not exercise control if the
investigatory action is not Charter compliant, we never have to ask whether the
application of the Charter results in an interference with sovereign authority of a foreign
state.”54
Interpreted properly, fidelity to the principles of sovereign equality and comity as
recognized in international law does not require that a state compromise its
extraterritorial prescriptive or adjudicative jurisdiction, though it does require
recognition that extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction, as a general rule, is
impermissible. For these legal concepts to have any meaning, they must be distinct. The
logic in Hape, however, suggests that extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction follows
inexorably from extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction and is thus flawed, for it denies
each concept of distinct utility. As Khadr clearly illustrates, Canada can apply the
Charter to governmental acts committed abroad through its right to exercise
extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction even though it lacks extraterritorial enforcement
jurisdiction. Once this logic is recognized, a central basis for the holding in Hape
“evaporates.”55

B. CONCLUSIONS BASED ON THE AUTHORITY OF PARLIAMENT
Building on the foundation established in its discussion of the principles of sovereign
equality, the majority opinion in Hape also concludes that extraterritorial application of
the Charter is impossible because such application is outside the authority of Parliament.
This conclusion is closely related to the first conclusion based on jurisdiction, but is in
fact distinct. Recall that the Court arrived at its first conclusion as to the Charter’s
applicability by reasoning—incorrectly, as I endeavoured to show above—that
extraterritorial application of the Charter is impossible because the principles of
sovereign equality and comity counsel against extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction.
Such jurisdiction, in the majority’s view, is a necessary precondition for extraterritorial
application.
The second conclusion is arrived at by extending those principles and anchoring them in
the actual text of the Charter. Recall that section 32(1) limits application of the Charter
to “all matters within the authority of Parliament.” But, the majority observes, “[a]
criminal investigation in the territory of another state cannot be a matter within the
authority of Parliament or the provincial legislatures, because they have no jurisdiction
to authorize enforcement abroad.”56 This focus on extraterritorial enforcement
jurisdiction as the only form of jurisdiction that matters in establishing what is within the
54

Ibid at para 162.
Currie, “Tortured Determinations,” supra note 5 at 318.
56
Ibid at para 94.
55
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“authority of Parliament” echoes the Court’s earlier reasoning: Since such jurisdiction, in
light of the Court’s conclusions regarding the binding principle of sovereign equality,
violates international law, the Court now concludes that any activity necessitating such
jurisdiction—all matters outside Canadian territory—is for that reason outside the
authority of Parliament.57 The Charter, hence, cannot not apply.
The Court’s second conclusion cannot be sustained. Putting aside that it is fundamentally
counterintuitive,58 the lack of extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction, as I attempted to
explain above, in no way forecloses Parliament’s ability to exercise extraterritorial
prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction. Even accepting for a moment that international
law should have some bearing on the interpretation of Canada’s Constitution in this
manner, both forms of jurisdiction are plainly legal in international law and hence
“within the authority of Parliament.”59 Any contrary conclusion would throw the
constitutionality of laws like the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, which
the majority accepted as constitutional,60 into doubt. By the same reasoning, and as
Khadr demonstrates, there is no need to exercise extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction
to provide a remedy for a breach of Charter rights.61 The argument that the Charter’s
extraterritorial application is outside the authority of Parliament thus necessarily fails if
the proposition that extraterritorial application in no way requires extraterritorial
enforcement jurisdiction is accepted.
More alarming, however, is the majority’s emphasis on narrowing the scope of section
32(1) based on its understanding of international law. In effect, though the Court

57

Hape, supra note 3 at para 94. The minority, however, disagreed: “I would disagree with LeBel
J. that if one cannot enforce Canadian law outside Canada the matter falls outside the authority of
Parliament and the provincial legislatures under s. 32(1)” at para 160.
58
If the activities of Canadian officials are outside the authority of Parliament, whose authority are
they under? The minority raises this point as well. See Hape, ibid at para 161 (“If the investigative
activities of Canadian police officers abroad do not fall under ‘matters that are within the authority
of Parliament or the provincial legislatures’, then the officers would have no jurisdiction
whatsoever to be conducting investigations abroad. Clearly, they do”).
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The Constitution of Canada disabuses one of any remaining ambiguity on this point: “It is
hereby declared and enacted that the Parliament of a Dominion [i.e., Canada] has full power to
make laws having extra-territorial operation.” Statute of Westminster (1931) UK 22 and 23 Geo 5,
c 4, s 3. The power to violate international law is thus among the “well-settled axioms of Canadian
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recognizes that Parliament can legitimately craft statutes that violate international law,62
the Court seems to have gone out of its way to interpret the clear language in section
32(1) to ensure that the Charter does not. The basis for the Court’s conclusion
concerning the interpretation of section 32(1) stems from its teaching that “[i]n
interpreting the scope of application of the Charter, the courts should seek to ensure
compliance with Canada’s binding obligations under international law where the express
words are capable of supporting such a construction.”63 By this logic, in light of its
determination that the language of section 32(1) is ambiguous, international law—
specifically the principle of sovereign equality—can therefore fill that gap. Though the
Court has for some time recognized that “customary rules of international law are
directly incorporated into Canadian domestic law unless explicitly ousted by contrary
legislation,”64 it is an entirely novel proposition to suggest that Canada’s own
Constitution should conform to international law.65 There are three compelling
reasons—one specific to section 32(1) and two more generally applicable to the
Constitution—for rejecting this rule of interpretation.
First, the interpretation given by the Court to the phrase “within the authority of
Parliament” fails to take account of its own prior understanding of the purpose of that
language. References to “authority of Parliament” and “the legislature of each province”
in section 32(1) “are merely a reference to the division of powers in ss. 91 and 92 of the
Constitution Act, 1867,” as the Court itself concluded in the early days of the Charter.66
In other words, the language was intended to avoid the possibility that one level of
government might seek to justify its encroachment on the legislative sphere of another
level of government on the basis that it needed to act to uphold the Charter.67 To now
read additional meaning into that language, as the majority in Hape does, thus creates
and exploits a textual ambiguity that did not previously exist.

62
Hape, supra note 3 at para 39 (“Parliamentary sovereignty dictates that a legislature may violate
international law, but that it must do so expressly”); para 53 (“[T]he legislature is presumed to
comply with the values and principles of customary and conventional international law. … The
presumption is rebuttable, however”); and para 68 (“By virtue of parliamentary sovereignty, it is
open to Parliament to enact legislation that is inconsistent with those principles, but in so doing it
would violate international law and offend the comity of nations”).
See also Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Canadian
Assn of Internet Providers, 2004 SCC 45 at para 141, [2004] 2 SCR 427; Reference re
Newfoundland Continental Shelf, [1984] 1 SCR 86 at 103, 5 DLR (4th) 385; and Reference re
Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia, [1967] SCR 792 at 816, 65 DLR (2d) 353.
The Judicial Committee of the Privacy Council has also held that Parliament is fully
competent to pass legislation with extraterritorial effect. Croft v Dunphy, [1933] AC 156.
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Hape, ibid at para 56.
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Ibid at para 37, citing Bouzari v Islamic Republic of Iran (2004), 71 OR (3d) 675 at para 65, 243
DLR (4th) 406 (CA).
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Currie, “Tortured Determinations,” supra note 5 at 315. I would add using international law as
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Hape, which is concluding that the Charter must conform to international law.
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Operation Dismantle v The Queen, [1985] 1 SCR 441 at 463-64, 18 DLR (4th) 481 [Operation
Dismantle].
67
Stribopoulos, supra note 46.
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Second, there is a firm basis to adopt different approaches to the interpretation of
ordinary statutes and the Constitution. The Charter, self-evidently, is no ordinary law,
neither from a hierarchical perspective or a linguistic perspective. In contrast to most
ordinary statues, which speak in relative detail and with precision, the Charter’s prose is
purposely broad and even vague. Any ambiguity in section 32(1) is therefore to be
interpreted, as one scholar has termed it, as “a meaningful silence.”68 International law
can, of course, be an aid to interpreting the scope of the Charter, just as it has been an
aid in interpreting the scope of its specific guarantees.69 But the Court should also look
to its traditional methodological approach to Charter interpretation: The Court has long
recognized it as “obvious” that the Charter is “a purposive document.”70 Justice Dickson
(as he then was), writing for a unanimous Court in Hunter v Southam, concluded that
“[i]ts purpose is to guarantee and to protect, within the limits of reason, the enjoyment of
the rights and freedoms it enshrines.”71 By way of example, in Operation Dismantle v
The Queen,72 the Court was urged to reject the notion that government action taken
pursuant to the royal prerogative was outside the “authority of Parliament” and thus not
subject to Charter scrutiny. The Court correctly rejected this argument. Justice Wilson
could find “no reason in principle to distinguish between cabinet decisions made
pursuant to statutory authority and those made in the exercise of the royal prerogative,
and since the former clearly fall within the ambit of the Charter, I conclude that the
latter do so also.”73 The majority’s opinion in Hape, however, makes no allowance for
such a purposive interpretation.
Third and finally, the interpretative approach adopted by the Court may
undemocratically limit Canada’s own sovereignty. As part of the Constitution, the
Charter is a part of “the fundamental law of the nation, effectively removed from
legislative whim or any practicable ability to repeal or amend.”74 Yet, the decision in
Hape implicitly suggests the meaning given to ambiguities and silences in the Charter
will automatically evolve independent of any democratic decision by the Canadian
people as a result of developments in international law in which Canada may have no
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See e.g., Slaight Communications v Davidson, [1989] 1 SCR 1038 at 1056, 59 DLR (4th) 416;
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agreement on the point of the Charter’s applicability. Dickson J (as he then was) concluded for
them: “I have no doubt that the executive branch of the Canadian government is duty bound to act
in accordance with the dictates of the Charter” at para 28.
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hand.75 If this is indeed the case, the Court has opened the door to an alarming abdication
of Canadian sovereignty.

C. THE PARADOX OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS EXCEPTION
Even if one takes the majority’s view of the law of jurisdiction as correct, the judgement
in Hape now suffers from a confounding logical flaw stemming from what has been
called the fundamental human rights exception. The possibility of such an exception was
first hinted at in Hape but only articulated fully in Khadr.76 In the latter case, the
Court—in a per curiam opinion—pointed to Hape as recognizing an “important
exception” to the general rule of the Charter’s inapplicability abroad.77 According to the
Court, Hape held that “if Canada was participating in a process that was violative of
Canada’s binding obligations under international law, the Charter applies to the extent
of that participation.”78 This assertion is baffling and leaves Hape in a state of selfcontradiction. Indeed, Justice Binnie’s admonition in Hape that “[t]he law of the
Constitution can only ‘grow and evolve’ if the Court leaves it the flexibility to do so”
appears remarkably prescient in light of Khadr.
The Court in Khadr describes the human rights exception “an important exception to the
principle of comity.”79 It is worth recalling, however, that the majority’s decision in
Hape did not rest on comity alone, but on two separate bases: first, the binding principle
of sovereign equality80 (or, more specifically, that Canada cannot assert extraterritorial
enforcement jurisdiction without violating international law) and second, the related
determination that extraterritorial application of the Charter was outside the authority of
Parliament.81 The non-binding principle of comity merely provided a supplementary
basis for confirming the conclusions reached on other grounds.82 Though it is evident
why another state’s breach of international law might negate fidelity to comity to that
state, the Court—neither in Hape nor in Khadr—offers any explanation for how such a
breach justifies an exception to the binding principle of sovereign equality. Indeed, the
Court does not even claim that there is an exception to these binding principles:
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One might respond to this argument by pointing out that it is open to Parliament to pass a law
extending the application of the Charter extraterritorially. This is a legally possible outcome; see
notes 60 and 63, above. Whether it is politically probable, however, is a separate question.
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Khadr, ibid at para 18.
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Ibid at para 19.
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[The] conclusion [in Hape that the Charter does not apply] was based
[first] on international law principles against extraterritorial enforcement
of domestic laws and [second] the principle of comity which implies
acceptance of foreign laws and procedures when Canadian officials are
operating abroad.
In Hape, however, the Court stated an important exception to the principle
of comity … 83
The inability to offer an exception is not surprising given the Court’s own admission that
it was split on the application of sovereign equality in Hape.84 Nevertheless, judging
from the silence in Khadr, the dictate of sovereignty equality—that there cannot be any
extraterritorial enforcement of the Charter—ostensibly remains sound. The problem, of
course, is that the majority decision in Hape posits—albeit incorrectly—that
extraterritorial enforcement is a prerequisite for Charter applicability; without such
enforcement, the application of the Charter is “impossible.”85 And yet, notwithstanding
this impossibility, the Charter applies in Khadr. Crucially, the Court in Khadr, though
perhaps silently recognizing the flaw in Hape, makes no attempt to explain the sorely
contorted state in which it has left that decision.
Separately, nowhere in Khadr are we told how Canada’s participation in a process that
violates international law somehow legalizes extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction and
consequently makes the assertion of such jurisdiction a matter within the authority of
Parliament.86 Of course, though it is open for Parliament to throw its binding obligations
of international law to the wind, the Court has voluntarily bound itself in Hape to
interpreting the Charter in a manner that conforms to international law.87 Accordingly,
even though comity may be moot, the problems associated with the application of
sovereign equality and authority of Parliament are very much still alive. Again,
notwithstanding all of this, the Court crafted a remedy in Khadr. Where does this leave
us?
First, the teachings of Hape are now in contradiction with one another. Setting aside that
the majority was wrong in its assessment that application of the Charter amounted to
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prohibited extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction, any conflicting principles in Hape
could be reconciled prior to Khadr. Even if a violation of international law negated any
obligation of comity, Hape makes clear that binding principles of international law
would still prohibit extraterritorial enforcement of the Charter. As such, no matter what
the circumstance, the application of the Charter abroad was, as the majority concluded,
“impossible.”88 Khadr, however, in purporting to apply an exception created in Hape,
has turned a piece of dicta into the whole substance of Hape.89 The Court’s opinion
completely sidesteps the question of how its decision to apply the Charter in Khadr can
surmount the concrete hurdles the Court itself created in Hape. We know now, however,
that extraterritorial application of the Charter is at once “impossible” and possible.90
It bears noting that in Amnesty International v Canada (Canadian Forces),91 the only
case to consider the doctrine established in Hape prior to the Supreme Court’s
subsequent decision in Khadr, Justice MacTavish of the Federal Court dismissed an
argument for the recognition of a “fundamental human rights” exception for the very
reasons highlighted above:
310 Surely Canadian law, including the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, either applies in relation to the detention of individuals by the
Canadian Forces in Afghanistan, or it does not. It cannot be that the
Charter will not apply where the breach of a detainee’s purported Charter
rights is of a minor or technical nature, but will apply where the breach
puts the detainee’s fundamental human rights at risk.
311 That is, it cannot be that it is the nature or quality of the Charter
breach that creates extra-territorial jurisdiction, where it does not
otherwise exist. That would be a completely unprincipled approach to the
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
312 I agree with the [government] that to find that the Charter applies,
where Charter jurisdiction does not otherwise exist, as a result of the
gravity of the impugned actions or their effects, conflates the question of
the existence of Charter jurisdiction with the question of whether a
fundamental right has been infringed.92
Speculation is, of course, a risky enterprise, but it is perhaps telling that the Federal
Court of Appeal, which had the occasion to affirm the Federal Court’s decision in
Amnesty after the Supreme Court’s holding in Khadr, declined the opportunity to
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comment on the problems created by a fundamental human rights exception as noted by
Justice MacTavish.93
Moreover, the approach in Khadr places the question of whether a breach of
international human rights law occurred ahead of the threshold question of whether the
Charter applies in the first instance. Allowing the question of a rights breach to usurp the
threshold question of Charter applicability has “an odd cart-before-the-horse feel to it.”94
Indeed, if this criticism is valid, the opinion of Justice MacTavish in Amnesty is prescient
in concluding that the recognition of a fundamental human rights exception results in a
“sort of ‘cause and effect’ approach … that conflate[s] the question of jurisdiction with
the question of whether an individual’s rights had been violated.”95

II.

A PATH FORWARD

The decision in Hape is premised on conclusions regarding the international law of
jurisdiction. Putting aside for a moment the problem, as I attempted to show above, that
these conclusions are flawed as matter of law, the Court’s focus on jurisdiction as a
starting point for determining whether the Charter can be applied abroad is misplaced.
The concept of jurisdiction is better suited to the question of how a state can assert itself
(for example, by criminalizing particular conduct) as opposed to whether others can
assert rights against the state (for example, by making a claim for a rights violation). A
better lens through which to tackle the question of extraterritoriality of the Charter is
thus the doctrine of state responsibility, a long-standing concept in international law.
Indeed, as a review of emerging jurisprudence in Europe and the United States shows,
foreign high courts are reaching sharply different conclusions on the question of
constitutional extraterritoriality than the Supreme Court of Canada, largely untroubled
by concerns about jurisdiction.

D. CONSTITUTIONS ARE DIFFERENT
Any discussion of extraterritoriality is amiss without mention of the classic scenario of
smoking in Paris. In this example, which is discussed by the majority in Hape,96
Parliament might pass legislation making it a criminal offence for Canadian nationals, or
perhaps even all persons, to smoke in the streets of Paris, thereby exercising
extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction on the basis of nationality. The prohibition,
especially if it includes all persons walking the streets, quite obviously raises questions
of sovereign equality and comity, but it is nevertheless prima facie legal.97 Of course,
should Canadian police officers march into Paris and began arresting all smokers—a
93
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clear act of extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction—that would be illegal under
international law.
The smoking in Paris analogy, however, breaks down in the context of the
extraterritorial application of the constitutional rights. Professor Attaran has attempted to
explain it this way: “Can it honestly be imagined that if the RCMP were frisking
Canadians for tobacco on the Champs-Élysées without French consent, but Canada
sought to restore comity by stripping those Canadians of their Charter rights [to bring an
action against their government in a Canadian court], suddenly the French would breathe
a sigh of relief and stop being irritated?”98 In other words, the important point here is
that extraterritorial application of the Charter is a rights-conferring act, while
extraterritorial application of other laws is a rights-negating act: Criminalizing smoking
in Paris takes away Parisians’ rights, whereas extending the Charter to cover the actions
of Canadian officials in Paris confers on them rights, albeit rights enforceable only in a
Canadian court.99
An obvious question then is how one should conceptualize a rights-conferring act.
Jurisdiction is still a factor, since the very act of conferring rights on persons abroad is
an act of extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction. The doctrine of state responsibility,
however, is more directly relevant, as I will show in the next section.

E.

LOOKING TO STATE RESPONSIBILITY

The doctrine of state responsibility is intended to provide accountability for instances
when states break their international legal obligations. It may be useful to think of the
concept “as akin to the legal principles of liability for wrongful acts found in most
domestic legal systems.”100 Crucially, as Ian Brownlie has observed, “[r]esponsibility is
the necessary corollary of a right.”101 Accordingly, when an international right is
breached by a state, the state is obligated, under the doctrine of state responsibility, to
make amends. It is also worth observing that state responsibility is a concept of general
application, “meaning that it is of potential relevance in virtually all substantive
international legal contexts.”102
In 2001, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution concerning “internationally
wrongful acts.”103 The resolution included the text of the draft articles of state
responsibility, which constituted the work of over half a century of the International Law
Commission (“ILC”), a body set up by the General Assembly in 1948 as a step toward
98
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its aspiration of “encouraging the progressive development of international law and its
codification.”104 In its resolution, the General Assembly only noted the draft articles,
meaning they lack legal force and are accordingly non-binding. Nevertheless, the body
did state that it “commends [the articles] to the attention of Governments.”105 Article 4,
for example, states:
The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State
under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive,
judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the
organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the
central Government or of a territorial unit of the State.
Article 6 attributes responsibility for the actions of any “organ” that contravenes
international law to a state “if the organ is acting in the exercise of elements of the
governmental authority of the State at whose disposal it is placed.” Similarly, Article 8
attributes responsibility for the actions of any person to a state “if the person or group of
persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that
State in carrying out the conduct.” Professor Attaran has observed that these doctrines
are “almost identical” to the teachings of the Supreme Court concerning Charter
applicability in RWDSU v Dolphin Delivery and its progeny.106 The lesson here is that
the UN system has endorsed principles which suggest that states should be held
responsible for their illegal actions, whether undertaken by the state itself or through
agents authorized by it. Such a principle is hardly foreign to the underlying values of the
Charter.
The remaining question then concerns how states can be held accountable for such acts.
Here there is an emerging notion that a state’s own judicial system can take
responsibility for violations of international law committed by that state’s own actors.
The International Criminal Court (“ICC”)—an institution whose creation Canada
ardently backed—is precisely such a forum. Genocide, crimes against humanity and
other international crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction are investigated and prosecuted
only after national courts have acted inappropriately or have altogether failed to act; the
ICC, in other words, is a court of last resort. Article 17 of the Rome Statute, the ICC’s
constating document, makes plain that a case shall be “inadmissible” if the matter “is
being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it” or if it “has
been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not
to prosecute the person concerned.”107
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The Rome Statute thus reflects the codification of the principle of “complementarity,”
whereby individual states have a primary obligation under international law—and
potentially a sovereign right—to prosecute international crimes. Complementarity
attempts to strike a balance by ensuring a forum for the prosecution of international
crimes without eroding or violating state sovereignty. Indeed, upon assuming office in
2003, the ICC’s chief prosecutor stated that, “[a]s a consequence of complementarity,
the number of cases that reach the Court should not be a measure of its efficiency. On
the contrary, the absence of trials before this Court, as a consequence of the regular
functioning of national institutions, would be a major success.”108 Some scholars have
gone so far as to suggest that “the ICC could participate more directly in efforts to
encourage national governments to prosecute international crimes themselves.”109
In discussing the ICC, my point here is merely to illustrate that international law
recognizes the valuable role that national courts play in ensuring state accountability by
undertaking the adjudication of violations of international human rights law. Notably,
the adjudication in such cases is conducted under domestic laws, which though similar in
what they criminalize,110 are technically distinct from international law. I note this
because it suggests that a Canadian court could, by the same logic, adjudicate an
infringement of Charter rights, which are quite similar to international human rights
obligations,111 as a mechanism of ensuring accountability of the actions of Canada and
its agents.112 Indeed, this is precisely what European and American courts have done in
their own contexts.

F.

LESSONS FROM ABROAD

Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) places an obligation
on its member states to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and
freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.”113 The language is quite similar to
that of section 32(1), though diction concerning “authority of Parliament” is arguably
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broader. Accordingly, the European Court of Human Rights’ interpretation of Article 1
can be instructive for our purposes.
Like the Supreme Court of Canada in Hape, the European Court has recognized that “the
jurisdictional competence of a state is primarily territorial.”114 That said, the European
Court has also recognized that “the principles underlying the convention cannot be
interpreted and applied in a vacuum” and that there are thus “other bases of jurisdiction”
which are “exceptional and requiring special justification in the particular circumstances
of each case.”115 What emerges, keeping with Article 4 of the ILC’s draft articles, is a
concern by the European Court that the applicability of the ECHR depends on the de
facto issue of which state is responsible for particular conduct, the answer to which may
be altogether different from which states exercises de jure sovereignty over the area
where the impugned conduct occurred.116
The European Court has thus recognized two separate heads of extraterritorial
jurisdiction.117 The first stems from state agent authority (SAA),118 where “persons who
are in the territory of another State but who are found to be under [the first] State’s
authority and control through its agents operating—whether lawfully or unlawfully—in
the latter State.”119 Jurisdiction here is justified on the basis that the ECHR “cannot be
interpreted so as to allow a State party to perpetrate violations of the Convention on the
territory of another State, which it could not perpetrate on its own territory.”120 European
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courts have applied SAA principles on at least two occasions. In the first case, a British
court found the ECHR was applicable to the case of an Iraqi citizen who was arrested
and subsequently died while being held in a British military prison in Iraq.121 In the
second case, the ECHR would have been applied to the case of six Iraqi civilians
tortured and killed by Turkish troops had the facts alleged been proven.122 Notably, both
examples bear some broad similarities to the facts of Amnesty, discussed earlier.
The second head of extraterritorial jurisdiction stems from the effective control of an
area (ECA), where a state through “the effective control of the relevant territory and its
inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military occupation or through the consent,
invitation or acquiescence of the government of that territory, exercises all or some of
the public powers normally to be exercised by that government.”123 The rationale here is
obvious and accords perfectly with the principles of state responsibility articulated in the
ILC articles. It is for the same reason broader than the SAA rule: “Where a Contracting
State exercises overall control over an area outside its national territory its responsibility
is not confined to the acts of its soldiers or officials in that area but also extends to acts
of the local administration which survives there by virtue of its military and other
support.”124 Deploying ECA principles, the European Court determined that the torture
of several individuals arrested by local officials in a secessionist enclave in Moldova
could be attributed to Russia as a result of Russia’s military presence in that area. The
court reasoned that Russia had effective control of the region, and thus responsibility for
all state actors within it, even though Moldova retained de jure sovereignty.125
The US Supreme Court has used reasoning similar to that of the European Court of
Human Rights in justifying its application of the writ of habeas corpus to individuals
detained by the US government at Guantanamo Bay. Though the court did not doubt the
US government’s assertion that “Cuba, not the United States, maintains sovereignty, in
the legal and technical sense of the term, over Guantanamo Bay,” that fact “does not end
the analysis.”126 In language strikingly similar to that of the European Court, the US
Supreme Court in Boumediene v Bush noted that the detainees are “held in a territory
that, while technically not part of the United States, is under the complete and total
control of our Government.”127 That fact, combined with a determination that extension
of the writ posed no insurmountable practical obstacles, led the Court to conclude that
the relevant portion of the US Constitution “has full effect at Guantanamo Bay.”128
American appellate courts, however, have been reluctant to adopt the more expansive
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implications of the European SAA doctrine,129 though no case involving this question
has yet reached the US Supreme Court.
An analysis of European and American jurisprudence thus shows that foreign high
courts, charged with giving meaning to human rights guarantees much like the Charter,
have come to fundamentally different conclusions as to international jurisdiction. Most
notably, concerns about extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction are completely nonexistent. Mindful nevertheless of the need to balance extraterritorial prescriptive
jurisdiction that recognizes state responsibility on the one hand, with sovereign equality
and comity on the other, these courts instead have devised control-based tests to
determine whether domestic human rights protections apply extraterritorially to entire
areas where the state exercises control. The European Court of Human Rights has gone
further by extending extraterritorial applicability to actions taken by authorized state
agents regardless of whether the state itself exercised effective control over the area.
These approaches can be instructive for Canada.130

III. RECONCILIATION
The discussion thus far as it relates to the jurisprudence on the extraterritorial
applicability of the Charter in Hape has been unfortunately negative. I have argued, first,
that the majority opinion in Hape is based on flawed conclusions about the nature of
international law—conclusions, notably, that foreign high courts have not reached.
Second, the fundamental human rights exception as articulated in Khadr undermines the
very legs that Hape stands on by suggesting extraterritorial application is no longer
impossible by virtue of Canada’s participation in a process that breaches international
law. Quite simply, the conclusion in Khadr cannot be reconciled with the reasoning in
Hape.
It should perhaps not be surprising, however, that the conclusion in Khadr is more easily
reconcilable with the minority opinion in Hape. Recall that though the judgement in
Hape was split five to four, the opinion in Khadr was unanimous and unsigned. One can
reasonably infer that a per curiam opinion was at least in part symbolic: The Court was
speaking with one voice on a highly contentious issue that had dominated public
discourse for years. One is left to wonder whether the price of unanimity was an opinion
that, while undermining the logic of the majority opinion in Hape, accords more
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harmoniously—in substance, if not form—with the approach adopted by the minority,
which itself accorded with the Court’s past precedents in cases such as R v Cook.131
The minority opinion in Hape, in contrast to the majority, expressly declined to use
international law as a “vehicle” for interpreting section 32(1).132 Rather, the minority
saw it as patently obvious that the Charter applied to all actions of the Canadian
government, at home or abroad.133 At the same time, the minority recognized that
“differences resulting from different legal regimes and different approaches adopted in
other democratic societies will usually be justified given the international context, the
need to fight transnational crime and the need to respect the sovereign authority of other
states, coupled with the fact that it is impossible for Canadian officials to follow their
own procedures in those circumstances.”134
Accordingly, the minority proposes an approach whereby the onus will be on the
claimant to “demonstrate that the difference between fundamental human rights
protection given by the local law and that afforded under the Charter is inconsistent with
basic Canadian values; the onus will then shift to the government to justify its
involvement in the activity.”135 In deference to comity and the principle of sovereign
equality, courts could “apply a rebuttable presumption of Charter compliance where the
Canadian officials were acting pursuant to valid foreign laws and procedures.”136 Only
acts that are “substantially inconsistent with the fundamental principles emanating from
the Charter” would then breach the Charter, requiring justification under section 1.137
The approach advocated by the minority opinion in Hape is salutary for two reasons.
First, the result in Khadr and its progeny, which together make up the most recent case
law on the Charter’s application abroad, accords with the approach adopted by the
minority. Though the Court did not proceed through the several steps that would form
part of the minority’s suggested approach, the substantive outcome—that there was a
violation of international rights that also offended the fundamental principles of the
Charter—is the same. More broadly, though, the minority approach offers a clearer and
more principled approach to the exception recognized in Khadr by starting with the
premise that that the government and its agents must act within justifiable bounds of the
Charter, which bounds will be informed not only by their domestic application but also
by an analysis of the international context.
Second, the minority opinion is also consonant with the principle of state responsibility.
Indeed, the minority’s approach, which goes beyond the more restricted ECA and SAA
doctrines espoused by the European Court of Human Rights, would arguably make
Canada a leader among states that provide a meaningful avenue for justice to those who
have suffered a deprivation of rights at the hands of national governments. It would be a
significant step in transforming state commitments to international human rights from
131
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“utopian ideals that have little bearing on the way states actually behave” to an
enforceable promise.138 It is thus regrettable that the Supreme Court in 2009 did not
grant leave to appeal in Amnesty,139 which would have been a fine opportunity to revisit
Hape in light of the lessons of Khadr. Under the minority approach, it seems reasonable
that the Court could have found the Charter to apply to the Canadian Forces’ actions
with respect to the Afghan detainees, but left for any subsequent action the question of
whether the Canadian government was violating international standards for the treatment
of detainees, which would presumably run afoul of section 7 of the Charter.140
It bears noting that the minority’s approach to extraterritorial application of the Charter
breaks new ground and will no doubt raise some challenging questions in the future. But
there is little reason to doubt that the Court will be able to evolve its approach over time
as needed, much as it has with the rest of its Charter jurisprudence. As Professor Roach
has observed, “If courts can tailor Charter requirements to the regulatory context, it is
difficult to understand why they cannot make adjustments for the foreign context.”141

IV. CONCLUSION
Lord MacMillan, the Scottish jurist, once remarked that “[w]here … so much depends
upon the avenue of approach to the question, it is very easy to take the wrong
turning.”142 As I have endeavoured to demonstrate here, in its decision in Hape, the
Supreme Court of Canada took the wrong turning: Interpreting the scope of the
Charter’s applicability solely through the lens of jurisdiction focuses on merely a limited
subset of the jurisprudence properly brought to bear for this important task. Instead, the
Court should have had regard for the emerging principles of state responsibility and it
should have placed greater weight on the values underlying the Charter.
It is crucial to remember what is at stake here. The majority in Hape places much
emphasis on the importance of Canada’s ability to contribute to the fight against
transnational crime. No doubt one should be mindful of the potential that the
extraterritorial applicability of the Charter may have the effect of restricting Canadian
officials’ participation in certain foreign activities. Under some circumstances, such
restrictions might even “fall short not only of Canada’s commitment to other states and
the international community to provide assistance in combating transnational crime, but
also of Canada’s obligation to Canadians to ensure that crimes having a connection with
Canada are investigated and prosecuted.”143 I share the view that facilitating an
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appropriate role for Canada in combating global crime—or terrorism—is a laudable
goal. But as Justice Bastarache observed for the minority in Hape, “I fail to see how the
Charter prevents us from taking into account this important societal need while holding
Canadian officers to their obligation to respect fundamental Canadian values.”144
There is another important lesson in Hape. As I have stressed, Khadr underscores
fundamental problems with the internal logic of the case and suggests that Hape is a
judgment that will not endure the test of time. The lesson then is one of judicial
minimalism: The Court should have declined the opportunity to reshape its section 32
jurisprudence on the back of a relatively uncomplicated case, when much more
complex—and controversial—cases were not far off on the horizon. One lone justice
made this point in Hape.145 Prudence counsels that the Court must not make “farreaching pronouncements” before it is required to do so, lest it forget, “There are more
things in heaven and earth, Horatio, Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.”146
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